State power and elite autonomy in a networked civil society: The board
  interlocking of Chinese non-profits by Ma, Ji & DeDeo, Simon
State power and elite autonomy in a networked civil
society:
The board interlocking of Chinese non-profits
Ji Maa,b, Simon DeDeoc,d,∗
aIndiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 301 N. University Boulevard,
Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA
bIntetix Institute, Beijing 100875, PRC
cSocial and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue,
Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
dSanta Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
Abstract
In response to failures of central planning, the Chinese government has exper-
imented not only with free-market trade zones, but with allowing non-profit
foundations to operate in a decentralized fashion. A network study shows
how these foundations have connected together by sharing board members,
in a structural parallel to what is seen in corporations in the United States
and Europe. This board interlocking leads to the emergence of an elite group
with privileged network positions. While the presence of government officials
on non-profit boards is widespread, government officials are much less com-
mon in a subgroup of foundations that control just over half of all revenue in
the network. This subgroup, associated with business elites, not only enjoys
higher levels of within-elite links, but even preferentially excludes govern-
ment officials from the NGOs with higher degree. The emergence of this
structurally autonomous sphere is associated with major political and so-
cial events in the state-society relationship. Cluster analysis reveals multiple
internal components within this sphere that share similar levels of network
influence. Rather than a core-periphery structure centered around govern-
ment officials, the Chinese non-profit world appears to be a multipolar one
of distinct elite groups, many of which achieve high levels of independence
from direct government control.
Keywords: board interlock, NGO, civil society, elites, state corporatism,
state power, state-society relationship, social network, People’s Republic of
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1. Introduction
1.1. Board Interlock and State Power
When the boards of different organizations have members in common—
when their boards interlock—they can synchronize both their values and
behaviors in the absence of explicit central control [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Organiza-
tions that share key members in this fashion can reap the benefits of network
connections and solve coordination problems [6, 7].
Board interlock is widespread in free-market societies, where it emerges
in the business sector as means for coordinating decisions and building social
influence [8]. In many countries, it spans multiple sectors, and links together
the nonprofit, commercial, and political worlds [9, 10]. In the donation-
based charity sector, board interlock helps coordinate of efforts and share
of information [11], and enhances both a nonprofit’s perceived legitimacy
and its capacity to acquire resources [12]. Among ethnic associations, the
“broker function” of board interlock generates and spreads political trust,
helping to build stronger civic communities and strengthening trust towards
government [13].
Much less is known about the political implications of board interlock
under authoritarian governments. For a government concerned with the dan-
gers of independent agents, interlock may be a benefit, because the resulting
coordination reduce the independence between organizations and make non-
government agents easier to control. However, these benefits exist only if the
government maintains control of the most central organizations in the result-
ing network. If it does not, board interlock may shift from an opportunity to
a threat: organizations may not only reap the benefits of coordination, but
now do so by coordinating around an independent agent.
Board interlock is crucial to understanding “infrastructural” forms of
state power [14]. Infrastructural power refers to the capacity of the state
to act through civil society, by penetrating, and thereby influencing, its in-
stitutions. Infrastructural power is often contrasted with despotic power:
the ability of state elites to act without formal negotiations with civil soci-
ety, through top-down, unilateral action. The coordination enabled by board
interlock provides an important means by which a state might amplify infras-
tructural power—or, conversely, a means by which non-governmental actors
may reduce it.
The world of non-profit foundations in the People’s Republic of China
provides a key test case for how a central authority confronts the challenges
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of an emergent network of non-governmental organizations. In short: how
does an authoritarian regime deal with the counter-power that may develop
when agents of a putative civil society connect together?
1.2. How Much Autonomy? A Brief Introduction to Civil Society and the
Chinese Nonprofit Sector
While charities and “social organizations” appear early in China’s history,
the majority were closed down during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s
and 1970s [15]. The nonprofit sector only re-emerged during the reform era
of the 1980s, as part of the government’s push to decentralize and devolve
power away from direct state control [16, 17]. In the following decades, the
sector has expanded so rapidly that scholars today ask whether or not it
represents the rise of a Chinese civil society: a dense network of groups that
bring together citizens to accomplish activities outside of government control.
That concept, civil society, has its origin in the 19th Century, when Alexis
de Tocqueville connected the early stages of American democracy to the
growth of voluntary associations of ordinary citizens for everything from the
promotion of temperance to the founding of schools [18]. Ever since, political
theorists and sociologists have tried to understand the role that these associ-
ations might play in the liberalization of authoritarian regimes and the early
stages of democratic rule [19]. The concept of civil society has continued to
evolve; in a recent study of the “illegal” NGO sector within China, Ref. [20]
quotes Ref. [21] to describe a neo-Tocquevillian concept of civil society as “an
autonomous sphere of social power within which citizens can pressure author-
itarians for change, protect themselves from tyranny, and democratize from
below”. For these reasons, hard-line members of the Chinese government are
liable to view the very concept of civil society as a “trap” [22]. A central
theme of research on the Chinese nonprofit world is thus how autonomous
organizations can be in presence of state control [16, 23].
Yet the existence of non-governmental associations does not necessarily
imply a civil society in the Tocquevillian mode or even a threat to authori-
tarian rule. While countries in the West have accepted nonprofits that oper-
ate independent of government control, foundations in China must contend
with a one-party system potentially intolerant of organizations that might
hold it accountable or draw attention to its deficiencies, and that therefore
strives to control and monitor it. Concerns about the lack of autonomy
in the nonprofit sector have led many observers to talk in terms of state-
corporatism [24, 16], where the nonprofit sector is an auxiliary and dependent
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system of the state. In the classic definition of Ref. [25], the relevant orga-
nizations in state-corporatism parallel those of government agencies, being
“singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmental-
ized, interest associations exercising representational monopolies”.
In general, civil society can be understood through a paradigm focused ei-
ther on conflict, or on contingent cooperation. Theories that focus on conflict
assume that the state and non-state organizations have goals that are in fun-
damental tension. These theories leave little room for extensive cooperation
between the two sectors. The neo-Tocquevillian conception of civil society
is the most explicit form of this conception, while, in the particular case of
Chinese non-profits, the idea of civil society as a challenge to state power can
be found in Ref. [26] which describes a “system of graduated control” where
the state exerts different control strategies over different types of nonprofits,
depending on the level of threat these extra-government organizations are
seen to pose.
By contrast, the contingent cooperation paradigm sees non-profits as po-
tential service arms of the state, at times able to implement the state’s goals
in a more efficient and effective fashion. Spires’ 2011 paper [20] popularized
an account of this form, based around the idea of a “contingent symbiosis”
between government and civil society, in which illegal NGOs are allowed to
operate as long as they relieve the state’s responsibilities for social welfare.
Another example is provided by Ref. [17], which describes a “consultative
authoritarianism” that promotes at one and the same time an “operationally
autonomous civil society” and a “sophisticated authoritarianism that uses
more indirect tools of social control”.
1.3. Networked Civil Society
Because of the power of the Chinese state, research into its nonprofit world
tends to focus on how much autonomy can exist in the presence of state con-
trol [16, 26, 23, 27]. Previous studies have documented the strategies and
tactics of individual nonprofits, either through case studies or the identifica-
tion of qualitative patterns of behavior across multiple cases [28, 29, 30, 17].
Civil society, however, is more than just the existence, and even the au-
tonomy, of non-governmental organizations. It is how these organizations
connect together, in a horizontal fashion, to form something more than a
catalog of distinct endeavors [31]: organized “multiple, overlapping, and in-
tersecting sociospatial networks of power” [32].
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To understand civil society in China, in other words, we must study not
only how the state acts on individual foundations, but also how it interacts
with the networks through which these foundations share personnel, infor-
mation, and resources. The infrastructural power the state exercises may be
both enhanced, and dissipated, by the horizontal connections between the or-
ganizations it penetrates. Board interlock is one of the primary mechanisms
for this self-organization to take place, and yet we know next to nothing
about how this process has unfolded, and the implications of this evolution
for civil society in twenty-first century China.
We will study the Chinese state-society relationship by looking at the
evolution of the non-profit board interlock network. To do this, we draw
on a large dataset of officially-registered nonprofit foundations. This dataset
records not only important information about each foundation, but also the
list of board members, enabling us to construct the board interlock network.
Our analysis can then operate at two levels simultaneously: (1) at the level
of the individual foundation, and (2) at the level of the network, where edges
between foundations are defined by the sharing of board members.
At the level of individual foundations, our data show the high level of
presence of government officials on foundation boards. Examination of how
the number of government officials varies by working areas and foundation
type shows how the presence of government officials correlates with activities,
and legal status, that the government is expected to be most concerned to
control.
At the network level, we find that board appointments connect together
a significant fraction of legal Chinese foundations into a single network. Our
results show the existence of network elites, associated with business en-
trepreneurs and their foundations, that form preferential ties to each other.
This subnetwork appears to preferentially exclude government officials from
its most central nodes, providing evidence that the network acts in part to
frustrate the magnification of state control that might be expected to arise
in the presence of board interlock.
The sharing of board members not only connects foundations together,
it also appears to preferentially connect them into clusters: groups of nodes
that, taken together, tend to preferentially connect to each other rather than
the other nodes in the network. This phenomenon has been studied quan-
titatively by Ref. [33], for the case of the board interlock network among
large corporations. In that study, the authors were particularly interested
to determine whether the interlock network showed either a classical “core-
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periphery” structure based around a single hegemon, or evidence for a the
existence of a more “multipolar global order”.
Such an analysis has a natural analog to the question of the extent of
civil society within a nation: do foundations interlock with a government-
controlled core, or do they associate into independent structures with central
positions that rival that of any putative hegemonic core? We find strong
evidence for the latter, detecting distinct clusters at the very center of the
network. These clusters show a strong bimodaility in levels of government
control, either preferentially excluding, or including, government officials.
The Chinese non-profit world is a multipolar one, with different groups at
the center showing distinct relationships to government control.
Taken together, our findings suggest the emergence of a form of network
autonomy that exists despite high levels of individual-level government ap-
pointments to nonprofit boards. At the same time, the association of this
network autonomy with the business elite—rather than “ordinary” citizens—
means that this autonomy may not lead to the kind of pluralism associated
with a Tocquevillian civil society.
2. Methods
2.1. Dataset and Network Construction
Our primary dataset is the Research Infrastructure of China Founda-
tions (RICF [34]; the underlying data is available at Ref. [35], and addi-
tional, processed files including the networks derived for this analysis are
available at [36]). The RICF database contains the records of the 3,344
legally-registered foundations within mainland China between 1981 and 2013.
Information about each foundation is drawn from six different sources, in-
cluding both official government reports and information submitted to the
government, or reported on websites, by the foundations themselves. Com-
paring RICF’s counts to other reference sources, the RICF’s data appears to
be at least 90% complete. The data is restricted to foundations allowed to
conduct fundraising; while these foundations are outnumbered by the much
larger number of less formal “associations”, they are the most developed form
of non-profit institution, and control just over 76% of all non-profit funding
in the nation.1
1The 3,344 foundations in the RICF database control approximately 35.3 billion RMB
(BU); this amounts to a large fraction of the 45.9 BU of non-profit funding, tracked by
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RICF strives to be as comprehensive as possible; it includes foundations
that may, for example, may be essentially defunct. Within RICF data is a
subset of foundations that have undergone an evaluation process, which rates
the foundations according to a set of criteria including governance structure,
financial transparency, and program effectiveness. Foundations which receive
a “3A” or above (3A+) are considered to have passed this evaluation. Be-
cause the 3A+ evaluation includes checks on transparency and reporting,
we expect the data associated with 3A+ foundations to be more reliable;
because it also includes checks on effectiveness and governance, we expect
these foundations to be more active. Comparing our analyses with the 3A+
set allows us to test for unexpected sensitivities to both data quality, and
foundation activity levels, in the database as a whole.
For each foundation, RICF logs the names, gender, and date of birth of
the board members. This allows us to resolve name collision and therefore
construct the board interlock network: two foundations are connected when
they share one (or more) board members. For simplicity in this analysis,
our network is unweighted: we consider only the presence or absence of at
least one shared member, and do not distinguish whether links are created
by sharing presidents, secretaries, or ordinary members. Extensions to the
study of weighted ties are certainly possible: one could, for example, con-
sider weighting the edge by the number of board members shared. Such a
weighting would add additional methodological complexities, however, since
foundations with larger boards will have the ability to form stronger ties with
each other. This may or may not correctly represent the underlying social
dynamics: if two foundations with very large boards share two members, it
may not make sense to represent them has having stronger ties to each other
compared to two foundations with very small boards and only a single mem-
ber in common. One could attempt to normalize the weights by board size;
in the case, however, that the two foundations so connected have different
sizes, we now have asymmetric edge weights. More sophisticated models yet
could be constructed, on the basis of a probabilistic model for connection
formation: for example, one could consider edge weight relative to a null
model where ties are formed at random. In this analysis, for both simplicity
and to allow direct comparison to prior literature in other areas of the world,
the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China in 2013, for all “associations” and related classifica-
tions [37].
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we follow the standard choice of unweighted edges.
The RICF data also contains the date of incorporation for each foun-
dation, allowing us to study how the final network assembled over time.
Inconsistencies in historical reporting rates and availability of data make it
difficult, if not impossible, to produce an exact history of entrances and de-
partures over time. We can, however, approximate this process by seeing how
the network would have assembled if the foundation’s board had remained
unchanged to the present.
This is only an imperfect tracer of the more detailed question that includes
both the formation of a foundation, and the ways in which the network might
be altered by the addition or removal of board members. However, prior work
suggests that this approximation may not be that bad. A study of non-profits
in Spain found that initial boards were usually assembled by the founders,
and that while nonprofits needed a period of development to attract outsiders
as potential board members [38], this early growth appeared to stop when
the non-profit reached maturity. A study in the United Kingdom found
that the majority of nonprofit boards remained unchanged on timescales of
three years, and that it was difficult for to recruit new board members [39].
Little is known about the Chinese case, however; where relevant, we draw
attention to cases where “the structure at time t, given board compositions
in 2015” is only an approximation, at best, to “the structure at time t, given
board compositions at time t”. In general, our dynamical analysis is limited
to asking questions of the form “when did organizations responsible for the
current trend join the system?”.
2.2. Variables
Four critical variables help us characterize foundations at the individual
level.
Public Fundraising vs. Non-Public Fundraising. The main legal distinc-
tions in the Chinese nonprofit sector governs the scope of fundraising. “Pub-
lic fundraising” foundations are allowed to raise money from the general
public—for example, through fund drives and advertising—while “non-public
fundraising” foundations may not (as shorthand, we refer to these as “pub-
lic” and “non-public” hereafter). Moreover, public foundations are further
constrained by geography; “central-level” foundations may raise funds at the
national scale, while province-level and city-level foundations are restricted
geographically. The Chinese Charity Law, effective from 1 September 2016,
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will nullify the distinction between public and non-public fundraising; how-
ever, the ability of organizations to raise funds from general public will still
be controlled by license issued from the state.2
Politically Sensitive vs. Politically Non-Sensitive. We supplement the
RICF by hand-coding the foundations’ mission statements by whether or not
they are involved in a potentially controversial or politically sensitive area
(“sensitive” vs. “non-sensitive”). Tracking this variable allows us to look
for systematic attempts to selectively control certain topics. If a foundation
has one or more of the following characteristics it is coded as “sensitive,”
otherwise it is coded as “non-sensitive” [20, 26, 40, 41]:
1. Involving advocacy, e.g., human rights, labor issues, and environmental
policy.
2. Involving international affairs, e.g., programs promoting international
cultural exchanges.
3. Involving religious or ethnic issues, e.g., Christian activities and Tibet
issues.
4. Involving the police or the legal system, or related “social stability”
(weiwen) issues.
In order to control the researchers’ bias toward coding, two assistants,
who were unaware of the research purpose, were asked to independently
classify foundations, solely according to the information provided in their
mission statements. Discrepancies between the two assistants were finalized
by a third person who is a doctoral candidate in China studies.
State Power. Our main tracker of state penetration into the non-profit
sector is the number of government officials in senior management positions.
The presence of government officials on a foundation board is a clear mech-
anism by which the state can exercise control; at the same time the state,
at least explicitly, forbids government officials from serving on these boards.
Official law (Article 23) is that “principals” (the board chair (president),
deputy chair, or secretary general) should not be currently employed by the
state.3
2Xinhua News Agency: NPC hopes charity law can help poverty fight, available
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/09/c_135172544.htm, last accessed
June 14, 2016.
3“Regulations on the Management of Foundations” (4 February
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Law against direct government involvement are commonly violated. The
standard annual reporting forms even asks foundations to report the number
of principals who are government staff; a non-negligible fraction (18%) report
non-zero numbers of current government officials. As a different measure of
state influence, we hand-coded the 3A+ foundations, noting whether or not
the board president is a current or retired government official. Hand-coding
is a difficult and laborious task; because it can be difficult to ascertain the
current status of individual, our 3A hand-coding includes both retired and
currently-serving government officials, and is thus not directly comparable
to the self-reporting set.
We thus count the number of government officials in three different ways.
The RICF counts the number of current government officials who serve as
principals; it also counts the number of simultaneously retired and senior
government officials who serve as principals; and (for a hand-coded subset)
it counts the number of either current or retired government officials who
serve as the board president. Note that the Article 23 law does not forbid
retired government officials from serving as board principals, and these people
may well still represent government influence [42].
Registration Level. Depending on their scope of operation, foundations
may be registered at the city level, the province level, or the central level.
Central-level registrations enable the foundation to operate on a national
scale. Registration level gives us information on both the scope of foundation
operation, and also allow us to look for preferential interlocking as a function
of both scope (e.g., do central-level foundations preferentially connect to
each other) geography (e.g., do same-city registrations connect preferentially
versus different-city).
3. Results
3.1. Individual-Level Statistics and the Presence of State Power
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the foundations in the RICF data. Col-
lectively, the 3,344 foundations in our data have a combined income of 35.3
2004), Article 23; original text available at http://www.mca.gov.
cn/article/yw/shjzgl/fgwj/201507/20150700850200.shtml, see En-
glish translation at http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/
regulations-on-the-management-of-foundations-chinese-text, last accessed
18 April 2016.
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Total Numbers Yearly Income
Non-sensitive Sensitive
Public 954 (28%) 356 (11%)
Non-Public 1913 (57%) 121 (3%)
Non-sensitive Sensitive
Public 13.9 BU 3.2 BU
Non-Public 17.5 BU 0.7 BU
Table 1: Foundation status, activity, and yearly budgets (in billions of yuan; 1 BU ≈
150 M$ in 2016) for the 3,344 foundations in our database. The majority of the foundations
are concerned with neutral (non-sensitive) activities, and the majority are restricted to
private fundraising. Despite the fact that non-public foundations can not raise money
from the general public, they actually control the majority of nonprofit revenue in the
network.
Official or Retired-Official President Official Principal
(Hand-coded subset) (Self-reports)
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Public 74%± 3% 79%± 5%
Non-Public 41%± 3% 29%± 9%
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Public 34%± 1% 54%± 3%
Non-Public 9%± 2% 19%± 4%
Table 2: Government presence on foundation boards is widespread, but variable. Despite
explicit laws against the practice, foundations often have government officials as board
principals. Hand-coding of a subset of 520 foundation presidents (left panel) shows that
the practice of incorporating current or retired government officials is widespread. In both
hand-coded data, and self-reports in annual filings (right panel), foundations able to raise
funds from the general public, and foundations concerned with government unfavorable
activities, are more likely to be controlled in this fashion.
billion RMB; approximately 5.5 billion USD at current exchange rates. Par-
alleling Tocqueville’s accounts of the diverse initiatives of citizens in 19th
Century America, foundations in contemporary China range in activity in
everything from the promotion of the board game we´iq´ı (Go) to legal aid
for the indigent. The majority are restricted to non-public fundraising, and
work in non-sensitive areas. These non-public foundations control just over
half of the total yearly nonprofit revenue in the country.
Despite laws to the contrary, our results confirm persistent and high levels
of state involvement in the governance of foundations. Table 2 shows the
relationship between fundraising scope and activity, relying on both the hand-
coded 3A subsample that tracks the affiliations of board presidents, and
official self-reports in the full database. Because the 3A hand-coding includes
12
Public Non-Public
Central 82%± 1% 72%± 1%
Provincial 47%± 2% 36%± 2%
City 67%± 1% 24%± 1%
Table 3: The fraction of nodes of each type that share board members with other foun-
dations. The board interlock network extends to a significant fraction of all Chinese non-
profits. Both public and non-public fundraising foundations are highly integrated into the
overall network, with central-level foundations able to raise from the general public the
most connected of all.
retired officials, the two methods track slightly different phenomena.
Both methods confirm that the presence of government officials is less
for non-public foundations. The government is most involved in foundations
that are able to raise funds from the general public. (Self-reports, but not
our hand-coding, show additional supervision when the foundation itself is
associated with sensitive activities. Because this signal does not appear in the
hand-coded subset, it may be best-explained by differing incentives: public
foundations involved with sensitive activities may be more willing to report
government officials on their boards, despite the fact that this violates Article
23.)
3.2. Board Interlocking: Super-Connectors and Elites
Board interlock is widespread. A significant fraction of the foundations
are integrated into the network: of the 3,344 foundations, 1,411 (42%) share
board members with at least one other foundation, for a total of 1,863 links.
As shown in Table 3, foundations at the central level are the most likely to
be connected. Both public and private foundations show significant network
integration. A large fraction of this network is connects together, into a single
giant component that contains 1,022 foundations (see Fig. 1).
While the existence of board interlock parallels the dominant corporate
cases studied in the West, there are significant differences. Most notably, the
network is not small world: the average path length between nodes in the
giant component is 7.71, and the network diameter is 27; in both cases much
larger than the corporate board interlock seen in the United States [43].
The board interlock network in Chinese foundations, in other words, has
a tendency to isolate nodes from each other. Even if we restrict to the 77
central-level foundations in the giant component, the diameter remains large
(9 steps); by comparison, the network of Fortune 800 firms in the 1970s,
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Figure 1: The giant component of the board interlock network, containing 1022 nodes
and 1626 edges; 75% of the nodes with non-zero degree, and 30% of the full database.
A simple spring loaded network layout algorithm allows us to visualize which nodes are
tightly coupled to many others (end up at the center), and which are connected to the
main network by only a small number of links to peripheral nodes. At the center are a
small number of interlinking elite super-connectors with high degree (Fig. 2; Fig. 3). Node
size is scaled by PageRank; node colors label the top ten largest clusters found using the
Louvain algorithm (see Table 7).
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Figure 2: The degree distribution of the board interlock network. The distribution is
log-normal (dashed-line fit), and a small fraction of the nodes have unusually high degree.
nearly ten times larger, had a diameter of five [44]. Chinese foundations
connect to each other, but the existence of these long paths shows that board
interlocks are fundamentally limited in their ability to coordinate action on
the very largest scales.
While the network has few shortcuts and hubs that connect otherwise
distant nodes, it is also the case that a small number of foundations have very
high degree—they share an unusually large number of board members with
other foundations. We show the network degree distribution in Fig. 2. The
existence of these “super-connectors” can be empirically confirmed by testing
for heavy-tailed degree distributions; standard methods strongly prefer a log-
normal distribution to both an exponential (i.e., random-graph) and power-
law fit [45, 46].
These super-connectors appear to preferentially connect to each other,
suggesting the existence of highly connected elite groups (the “rich-club phe-
nomenon”, first noted by Ref. [47]). Fig. 3 shows the rich-club coefficient in
the full, the public, and the non-public subnetworks. To read this figure, first
follow the solid line; that this line is rising as a function of k shows that, in
the full network, nodes with higher degree are more likely to connect to each
other than in a null model that preserves the node degree distribution but
otherwise shuffled connections. Now follow the dashed line, which considers
just the internal connections of the non-public subnetwork. This line shows
that this same phenomenon, seen in the full network, is even stronger here:
non-public elites are even more likely to preferentially connect within this
15
Figure 3: The rich-club coefficient as a function of k-core. High-degree organizations
(“network elites”) preferentially connect to other network elites, particularly in the non-
public network. This is apparent in how the rich-club coefficient grows as a function of
k-core level for the full network (solid line), the public network (dotted line), and the non-
public network (dashed line); 95% confidence ranges are shown. Nodes with high degree
are far more likely to connect to each other, compared to a null model that preserves
the degree distribution but otherwise breaks interlock correlations [74]. Taken separately,
the non-public network shows a stronger rich club effect than the network as a whole.
Meanwhile, the majority of high-degree links in the public network are due to cross-links
with the non-public foundations; the maximal degree for the public network in isolation
is much smaller.
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subnetwork. Finally, note the (very short) dotted line. This shows at best
weak evidence for a rich-club effect when restricting to the public network.
The line is much shorter, because the public network, considered in isolation,
has few high-degree nodes: if a public foundation has high-degree in the full
network, it is usually because it connects to non-public foundations.
If we code nodes by the board president’s profession, we find that the
highest degree nodes include both the government and the business elite.
Of the ten highest-degree foundations, six are associated with businesses,
four with government. For example, the most connected foundation is the
YouChange China Social Entrepreneurs Foundation, set up to encourage
philanthropic giving by wealthy entrepreneurs; the second is the Forbidden
City Cultural Heritage Conservation Foundation, which manages the state-
owned historical treasure. The top ten most connected board members are
also a mixture of both government and business elites; three are business
elites, six are current government officials, including members of the National
People’s Congress, the CPPCC, and the Guangzhou People’s Congress; and
one is a retired government official.
Considering the public and non-public networks separately allows us to
see how different groups dominate. In the public network, the highest-degree
nodes are nearly all associated with the government: of the top ten high-
est degree foundations, only two have a president with a non-governmental
background (a television celebrity, and the head of a hospital). By contrast,
six of the ten highest degree nodes in the non-public network are associated
with business elites. The highest degree node, for example, the YouChange
Foundation, is run by the businesswoman Ping Wang, whose background is
in international finance and law.
Board interlock is influenced by both geography and registration level; see
Table 4, paralleling classic results for corporate networks, co-located founda-
tions are far more likely to connect [48, 49, 50]. We also find evidence for
preferential connections between sensitive foundations; there are 70%± 10%
more links between sensitive foundations than found in the null. However,
public- and non-public foundations appear to intermix freely and preferences
(though detectable) are weak; public foundations are only 16% ± 3% more
likely to link to each other than null, and only 17% ± 3% less likely to link
to non-public foundations.
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Central Province City
Central ×2.1± 0.1 ×0.73± 0.03 ×1.2± 0.2
Province (same) — ×7.05± 0.08 ×4.7± 0.5
Province (different) — ×0.42± 0.01 ×0.46± 0.05
City (same) — — ×14.6± 0.9
City (different) — — 0
Table 4: The number of links found between nodes of each type, compared to a degree-
preserving null. Foundations in the same region, and at the same registration level, tend
to cross link. Centrally-registered foundations are more than twice as likely to connect
to each other than in the null; province-level foundations connect to others in the same
province at rates seven times higher than the null, and city-level foundations are the most
cross-linked of all, linking to other city-level foundations in the same place at rates 14
times higher than expected.
Public Non-Public Joint
Predictor Network Network Network
(Legal Status)
Central Level 0.72± 0.15??? 0.90± 0.16??? 1.6± 0.2???
Evaluation 3A+ 0.33± 0.12??? 0.55± 0.12??? 0.66± 0.12???
Public — — −0.1± 0.1
(State Power)
Current Official 0.17± 0.08? −0.44± 0.13??? −0.15± 0.11
Retired, Senior Official 0.0± 0.1 0.1± 0.2 0.2± 0.2
(Intrinsic)
Board Size (z) 0.31± 0.04??? 0.28± 0.04??? 0.52± 0.04???
Income (z) 0.19± 0.04??? 0.16± 0.04??? 0.40± 0.04???
Age (z) −0.03± 0.05 0.00± 0.04 −0.06± 0.04
Sensitive Area −0.10± 0.08 0.33± 0.16? 0.13± 0.11
R = 0.42 R = 0.34 R = 0.44
Table 5: Predictors of node degree, in public and non-public fundraising networks, and in
the joint network, in a multiple linear regression. Non-public foundations preferentially
exclude current government officials from the highest degree nodes, even when controlling
for other variables. (z) indicates z-scored transformed real variables; all other variables are
binary for presence/absence. ? superscripts label significance: ? (p < 0.05); ?? (p < 0.01);
? ? ? (p < 0.001).
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3.3. Network Effects: Penetration of State Power
We next consider how the presence or absence of government officials
predicts node degree. We use a multiple linear regression model, with node
degree as the dependent variable and nine independent variables: three vari-
ables describing the node’s legal status (public vs. non-public; registration
level; evaluation level), four “nuisance” variables describing the intrinsic
properties of the foundation (board size, income, sensitive area, and age),
and two variables operationalizing the state power: (1) current government
officials, and (2) retired, senior-level government officials, the two fields in
the main RICF database. We consider both the full network, and the two
public and non-public networks separately. The results are shown in Table 5.
The most surprising results concern the relationship between the pres-
ence or absence of government officials, and node degree. Foundation de-
gree is (weakly) positively correlated with government presence in the public
foundations: nodes with higher degree are more likely to have government
officials. However, in the non-public network, high degree is strongly (and
significantly, p < 10−3) correlated with reduced government presence. When
the two networks are joined together, the two effects compete against each
other, partially canceling out. Significantly, we find no correlation for the
presence or absence of retired senior officials; only the absence of currently-
serving officials is predicted by node degree. To allow comparisons between
different networks, we use z-score transformed data; for example, in Table 5,
the presence of a current official as board principal in the non-public network
shifts node degree down by roughly 0.44 standard deviations (controlling for
other factors), where a standard deviation is measured for all the nodes in
the non-public degree distribution.
Because Table 5’s results rely on self-reports, it is possible that these
effects may be driven in part due to differences in self-reporting. We can
check for this effect by using the hand-coded 3A subset; these results are
shown in Table 6; because the 3A hand-coding tracks only presidents, and
includes both current and retired officials, our results here are not strictly
comparable to the Table 5 case. The smaller size of this set also means that
our signal-to-noise is lower. In this subset, the weaker correlation in the
public data is no longer detectable, but we still see the negative correlation
between network position and state presence.
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Public Non-Public Joint
Predictor Network Network Network
(Legal Status)
Central Level 1.06± 0.26??? 1.0± 0.5? 2.6± 0.4???
Public — — −0.3± 0.3
(Government Control)
President Official 0.06± 0.25 −0.68± 0.37? −0.65± 0.34?
(Intrinsic)
Board Size (z) 0.42± 0.09??? 0.60± 0.19?? 0.81± 0.16???
Income (z) 0.28± 0.09? 0.38± 0.18? 0.75± 0.15???
Age (z) −0.04± 0.09 0.0± 0.2 0.0± 0.15
Sensitive Area −0.40± 0.20 0.4± 0.6 −0.4± 0.4
R = 0.48 R = 0.32 R = 0.44
Table 6: Predictors of node degree, in public and non-public fundraising networks, and in
the joint network; hand-coded 3A. Use of a different, hand-coded dataset for government
presence confirms the results of Table 5: non-public foundations preferentially exclude
current government officials from the highest degree nodes. The “president official” code
includes retired officials.
3.4. Network Clusters: Multipolarity
Following Ref. [33], we use the Louvain algorithm [51] to detect clustering
among the foundations in the network. The Louvain algorithm groups nodes
into clusters that maximize the total modularity, Q; informally, the modular-
ity for a cluster is defined the fraction of edges within that cluster, minus the
fraction of edges expected under a degree-preserving null model. When the
modularity is close to one, nodes in a cluster are strongly connected to each
other, and only weakly connected to nodes outside. When the modularity is
close to zero, by contrast, there is little evidence for the existence of clusters
of nodes that preferentially interconnect.
The foundation network shows strong modularity: the average Q for the
network is 0.816, and we find a total of 29 clusters. The top ten clusters by
membership include just over 50% of all foundations in the network. They are
shown, using different colors, in Fig. 1. The strong modularity of the network
points to the existence of structurally independent groups, a precondition
for multipolarity. However, it is possible for clusters to exist in the presence
of a strong core-periphery structure: a core hegemonic cluster could be at
the center of a set of more peripheral clusters. To test for this effect, we
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Cluster Size (Nodes) Average Degree PageRank Government Presence
1 91 5.4± 0.6 11% 2.1%??? (low)
2 68 3.3± 0.4 7.0% 2.9%??? (low)
3 66 3.9± 0.4 6.5% 11%
4 55 4.3± 0.6 5.7% 15%
5 53 2.7± 0.4 5.2% 30%??? (high)
6 50 3.1± 0.4 5.1% 16%
7 46 2.6± 0.2 4.2% 24%
8 43 2.9± 0.3 4.0% 28%? (high)
9 39 2.7± 0.2 3.7% 28%? (high)
10 38 2.6± 0.4 3.5% 34%??? (high)
Table 7: Size (in nodes), average degree, total PageRank, and rates of government presence
on boards, in the ten largest clusters of the foundation network. Network power, as
measured by PageRank, is shared reasonably equally among the clusters. Six of the ten
networks show anomalously high or low levels of government presence compared to the
baseline rate of 17%.
consider the average degree of nodes within the cluster, as well as the total
PageRank of each cluster; PageRank provides an independent measure of
network centrality, based on a random-walker model, and can be interpreted
as a consensus measure of attention [52] or power [53].
The results argue for the multipolarity hypothesis. While the largest
cluster has higher average degree, and larger PageRank than the others in
the top ten, the effect is not strong, and power is shared remarkably evenly
among the largest clusters. We can quantify this using the Gini coefficient,
which for the top-ten clusters is 19%, where zero is perfect equality. Put
another way, the distribution of PageRank among the top ten clusters is
more equal than the famously egalitarian income distribution in Denmark
(Gini coefficient 25% [54]), and far less than seen in PageRank distributions
found in networks among pages in the world-wide web [52]. The existence of
multiple clusters with high degree and high PageRank is consistent with the
rich club effect found above: these highly central clusters preferentially link
within themselves.
Finally, for each cluster, we compute the fraction of nodes within the
system that have government officials on the board. This allows us to test
whether or not the clusters are defined by characteristic levels of government
involvement. For the top ten clusters, we find strong evidence for bimodality
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in levels of government control. Clusters are much less likely to show “av-
erage” levels of government presence on boards, and tend to either extreme,
either strongly excluding government officials, or having far more than ex-
pected given the base-rate. Cluster-by-cluster in the top ten, we have four
cases where rates of government presence are either anomalously high, or
low, at the p < 10−3 level, and two more at the p < 0.05 level. The largest
and most central cluster of all has the lowest rates of government presence:
2.1%, eight times lower than the expected (null) rate of 17%. The exis-
tence of these extreme values in either direction allow us to reject the null
hypothesis—that rates of government presence are independent of cluster
membership—at p  10−6 in the standard Fisher test. A Bayesian model,
which explicitly models clusters as draws from one of two binomials with dif-
ferent values for the probability of government control, is strongly preferred
over a single binomial distribution at similar levels. These relationships are
shown in Table 7.
Taken together, these results suggest that the foundation network is a
fundamentally multipolar structure, where clusters have roughly equal levels
of network power and are subject to distinct levels of government control.
These clusters are further defined both by geography (since foundations with
provincial or city-level registrations tend to strongly associate, see Table 4)
and public/non-public status.
3.5. Longitudinal Analysis: the Emergence of Autonomy
How did these network effects evolve over time? Because board member-
ship changes over time, a full answer to this question would require knowledge
of the dates of both joining and departure for each member. In the absence
of this information, we can conduct an analysis of the evolution of this net-
work using the board compositions observed in 2015. This amounts to a
longitudinal analysis of civil society growth rather than a direct study of
network dynamics since we expect, particularly for the older organizations,
some changes in board composition due (at the very least) to retirement.
While this is, on short timescales and under the assumption that most or-
ganizations have relatively stable compositions year to year, a potentially
good approximation, such an analysis is better understood as answering the
question “when did the organizations responsible for the current structure
join the network”.
Fig. 4 shows the three critical metrics over time, under these assumptions:
(1) the size of the public and non-public network over time; (2) the changing
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Figure 4: Network evolution over time. As the non-public network grew (top panel), it
reported lower levels of government presence (middle panel); this contrasts with the growth
of the public network which began to report increasing levels of government presence in the
same period. In the years after 2008 (see text), the formation of new non-profits leads to
the emergence of a detectably negative relationship between node degree and government
presence in the non-public network (bottom panel): the highest degree nodes now appear
to preferentially exclude government presence.
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levels of government presence on boards; and (3) the evolution of the node
degree–government presence relationship.
Overlaid on these panels are five critical dates in the recent history of the
non-profit sector: (1) 4 June 1989, the Tiananmen Square protests, and the
emergence of civil society in China [16]; (2) 15 September 1995, the Fourth
World Conference on Women, associated with the accelerating development
of civil society in China [55]; (3) 1 June 2004, the day the Regulations on the
Management of Foundations, including the above-discussed Article 23, took
effect; (4) the Sichuan Earthquake of 12 May 2008, according to Ref. [56], a
critical date in the expansion of the non-profit sector’s horizontal linkages;
and (5) the 12th Five-Year plan for 2011–2015, introduced March 2011, which
devoted a full chapter to “social management innovation” as a key govern-
ment target. Fig. 5 shows the same plots, but now for the 3A+ hand-coded
subset, as discussed above.
Significant numbers of non-public foundations appear soon after the Tianan-
men Square protests, though none of the foundations from that year retain
3A+ status today. The effect of the 2004 Regulations on the growth rate is
clear: for at least the next five years, it led to literally exponential growth
in the number of both public and non-public foundations. The growth rate
in the non-public sector was significantly stronger, so that, by 2011, the
non-public sector was larger than the public one.
The effect of these same regulations on the levels of government super-
vision is more complex. The 2004 regulations meant that new organizations
reported lower levels of government principals in the non-public network.
This is consistent with new foundations becoming aware of, and responding
to, the restrictions of Article 23. This decline does not appear as strongly
in the 3A+ hand-coded subset, however, which suggests one of two explana-
tions: that new foundations are continuing to include government officials,
but staying within the letter of the law by including only retired officials, or,
that new foundations are continuing to include currently-serving government
officials, but under-reporting their presence in official paperwork. The effects
of Article 23 are inconsistent: the decline in reported government presence
does not occur in the public network; indeed, after 2008, reported government
presence starts to rise.
Most interesting are the effects of network growth on the relationship
between node degree and government presence. In both the full network,
and the 3A+ hand coded subset, we see that organizations responsible for
the current negative relationship between degree and government presence
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Figure 5: Network evolution over time; hand-coded 3A+ subset. Differences in overall
levels of supervision are do both to reporting effects, and the necessary inclusion of retired
officials in this set. Despite these coding differences, we see the same emergence of elite
autonomy signal (bottom panel) as in the full network; here the signal becomes detectably
negative after the introduction of the 2011 “Five Year Plan”.
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joined only late in the network history. Today the non-public network acts
to systematically exclude government officials from high degree nodes. In
the full network, the negative relationship becomes strong enough to detect
soon after the Sichuan earthquake. In the 3A hand-coded subset, the down-
ward trend towards increasingly negative relationships between degree and
government presence becomes detectable only after the 2011 Five Year Plan.
4. Discussion
Our quantitative work here confirms the unusual nature of the state-
society relationship in contemporary China, one that appears to give signif-
icant network powers to independent, non-governmental agents. There are
high levels of network clustering and autonomy, and a strong, inverse rela-
tionship between network centrality and government supervision. The world
of Chinese non-profits is not simple one of command-and-control, where gov-
ernmental agents dictate by direct presence the actions of the most important
players in the network. The nature and strength of these ties may allow for
the kinds of decentralized decision-making and policy influence seen in a
recent qualitative study of civil society organizations in the country [57].
At the same time, our analysis shows that these foundations are hardly a
free-wheeling sector beyond the reach of government power. Our most basic
results confirm the persistent and high levels of state presence throughout
the non-profit world. The appointment of government officials to high-level
positions on foundation boards means that the government continues to hold
significant levels of direct influence. In Tocqueville’s account of civil society
in the 19th Century United States, citizens formed voluntary associations
independent of the government itself. Whatever they are doing, the non-
profits of 21st century China are far from this 19th Century model, and far,
also, from models of post-Soviet democratization in Eastern Europe [19]. Our
quantitative results fit with what is widely seen in case studies and fieldwork
in China itself: state power may not be complete, but it cannot be ignored.
4.1. Inconsistent Control
Our results show significant differences in the level of governmental pene-
tration of the non-profit sector. This is most apparent among the non-public
foundations where, at least officially, only one in ten foundations have a cur-
rent government official as board principal. The government’s relationship
to its foundations is bimodal, with public foundations showing the highest
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levels of government involvement; not surprisingly, of this more supervised
group, the public foundations engaged in politically-sensitive topics receive
the greatest levels of supervision of all.
The unusual nature of these less-supervised, non-public foundations be-
comes apparent at the network level. A set of network elites are at the
center of the non-public network. These elites not only serve as hubs for
large numbers of other foundations, but preferentially connect to each other.
Examination of the profiles of the highest degree nodes shows that, in a par-
allel to the United States [9], the nodes responsible for these interconnections
are, primarily, the business elites.
Detection of this rich club effect provides a new view on the development
of horizontal relationships that can enable communication and cooperation—
a process captured in fieldwork studies of horizontal connections during the
2008 Sichuan Earthquake [56], and a missing piece for understanding the
development of state that increasingly devolves government functions to non-
government agencies [29].
That business elites play such a central role in the NGO network fits with
recent work that shows an increasing importance of non-corporate venues as
corporate networks fragment [58, 59, 60]. Our results go beyond a simple
demonstration of elite homophily, however, in showing how elites in an au-
thoritarian regime manage relationships with government officials.
In particular, our network analysis reveals an unexpected negative re-
lationship between node degree and government presence in the non-public
network. Not only is government penetration much lower overall in the non-
public foundations, it appears to have even less penetration to the founda-
tions at the network’s center. Horizontal relationships between foundations
appear to selectively exclude the top-down “vertical” control of the state in
a form of structural autonomy.
These horizontal relationships are arranged in such a way to create a mul-
tipolar structure at the heart of the foundation network. Rather than a set of
core-periphery relationships, the network’s high levels of clustering suggest
that the world of Chinese NGOs is fundamentally multipolar [33]. Distinct
clusters appear to share central places in the network, and the largely equal
share of network power given to each cluster means that there is little ev-
idence of a dominant hegemon to which all other clusters uniquely attach.
What inequality in network power exists appears, if anything, to be asso-
ciated with reduced levels of government presence: the two largest clusters
in the network have significantly lower levels of government presence than
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expected.
4.2. Emergence of Elite Autonomy
A dynamical analysis of network formation, shows how recent the cre-
ation of this partially autonomous sphere has been. Negative relationships
between network power and government control appeal soon after the 2008
Earthquake (the downward trend in the 3A subset appears around this time
as well, but only becomes statistically significant in 2011). This result lends
new support to the qualitative studies of Ref. [56], which associated the earth-
quake to lasting cultural, political, and social changes in the non-profit world
that led to new forms of autonomous civil society. Ref. [61] supports these re-
sults from a different angle, suggesting the increasing importance of private,
as opposed to state-controlled, organizations in non-profit relief. In a com-
parative of study of how government-controlled and private firms responded
to the 2008 Earthquake, they found that private firms donated to relief more
rapidly, and at greater levels of financial assistance, that state-owned firms.
Even many years after the 2008 Earthquake, these effects persist.
One more recent political change comes from the government: the pro-
motion of “social management innovation” (chuangxin shehui guanli), a core
concept of state policy first introduced in the 4th Plenum of the 16th CCP
Congress in 2004 [62, 63]; the 12th Five-Year plan for 2011–2015 elabo-
rated the policy as a governance target, proposing “party leadership, govern-
ment responsibility, societal cooperation, public participation” as key princi-
ples [64], the use of civil society to provide social services, and a correspond-
ingly less rigid approach to controlling it [65]. Our results confirm the impact
of these further reforms: in the post-plan era, the negative relationship be-
tween government presence and node degree has persisted.
Crucially, our data does not include the so-called “grassroots”, or illegal
NGOs that, while tolerated by the state, operate without legal sanction [20].
These NGOs sometimes include Communist party members on staff, are
largely tolerated by the state and often seen as socially legitimate organiza-
tions, and often provide essential services in cases where the state can not.
Despite their technical illegality, government officials sometimes even lend
explicit support to their mission. This qualitative work further suggests that
members of illegal NGOs are largely uninterested in organizing independently
in ways that might appear to threaten the state. Taken at face value, these
suggest that were data on the staff or board members of illegal NGOs to
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be incorporated into our networks, we would find them in a core-periphery
relationships to the officially-sanctioned actors we study here.
4.3. Civil Society and the Meaning of Network Connectivity
Network connectivity is associated with the ability to form common knowl-
edge [66], and both simulations and theory suggest that nodes of high degree
play a crucial role when common knowledge is required for joint action [67].
The negative relationship between node degree and government presence ob-
served in our data then amounts to a form of structural autonomy. Taken
at face value, these results seem to suggest that foundations within this non-
public subset may be part of the emergence of a new civil society, whose
interlocks occur increasingly independently of the state, and whose resul-
tant capacity for independent coordination might even be seen as a threat to
authoritarian control.
The identification of these links with a Tocquevillian civil society is com-
plicated, however, by the fact that when the most connected of the non-public
foundations are not government in origin, they appear, instead, to be drawn
from the business elite. The extensive ties between the state and business
then suggest that this civil society is something less than might be expected;
ever since the reforms of the 1980s, scholars have suggested that the business
elite act as an agent of the government itself [68].
Indeed, this provides a clear alternate explanation: if the highest degree
nodes are sufficiently aligned with the government to begin with, they can
be allowed to operate without direct supervision—precisely as we see in our
data. Whether or not the elite are truly independent of the government,
their special position in society, and their ability to influence the government
financially [69] suggests that this civil society, such as it is, is far from the
pluralist Tocquevillian world of the ordinary citizen. Understood in this
context, and with the caveat that our work here is able to cover only the
official NGOs, and not the illegal sector, these results are perhaps more
consistent with the theory of “consultative authoritarianism”, argued for by
Ref. [17], in which the government tolerates increasing levels of autonomy
among non-governmental organizations while developing new strategies of
indirect control. Networks of state power may overlap with ones defined by
economic exchange, but need not be coextensive [32].
Our results show that the government has come to tolerate communities of
interlocking associations that operate with lower levels of direct government
presence. Today, the total number of these organizations is small. The new
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Charity Law, effective from 1 September 2016, allows a far greater number of
associations—potentially in the hundreds of thousands—to raise funds from
the general public. We expect the rapid expansion in both the size and
scale of the Chinese non-profit sector will radically increase its impact on the
state-society relationship.
4.4. Networked Civil Society and Multipolar Structure
Finally, our cluster analysis suggests that the social actors in civil society
are organized into larger clusters by horizontal relationships, and arranged
in such a way to creature a relatively equal relationship between the most
important clusters in the network: a multipolar world [33] of Chinese NGOs.
Distinct clusters appear to share central places in the network, and the equal
shares of network power given to each cluster is very different from a system
with a dominant hegemon to which all other clusters uniquely attach.
The clusters are not perfectly equal in network power. The inequality in
network power that does exist appears to be associated with reduced levels
of government presence: the two largest clusters in the network have sig-
nificantly lower levels of government presence than expected. This result,
concerning the most powerful clusters of individual nodes, parallels the re-
sults on elite autonomy among the nodes with greatest network power on the
individual level.
By allowing these more egalitarian, more horizontal structures to emerge—
and, further, by allowing the most important of these structures to operate
with increased independence from central monitoring—the state may have
made it possible for organizations to make more efficient use of local and dis-
tributed knowledge [70]. The patterns in which these new structures arrange
themselves call to mind classic theories of decentralized decision-making in
liberal societies that draw attention to autonomous, spontaneous, and “poly-
centric” orders [71, 72]. At the same time, persistently high levels of state
involvement in the sector frustrate a simple analogy to descriptions of liberal
states. Our account of Chinese civil society here, in terms of the simultaneous
presence of both horizontal (group-to-group), and vertical (group-to-state)
linkages, and the structural tensions between the two, finds parallels in re-
cent work on collective action in rural China [73], which identifies a new
class of “semi-integrated” organizations that can mobilize both horizontal
and vertical linkages at once.
Remarkably, the Chinese government does not appear to be combating
the emergence of a potential civil society counter-power either through direct
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monitoring, or through disruption of network ties. There is plenty of evidence
that individual foundations in the official Chinese non-profit sector today are
relatively tame, with a strong tendency to align their goals with that of the
state [17]. Yet the underlying network structures that these organizations
have implicitly created have the potential to enable more independent ac-
tion and decision-making than one would expect; they are certainly very far
away from the highly centralized social structure and planned economy that
characterized mainland China during Mao’s rule. Our work suggests that
the government will either increasingly employ less-visible strategies of con-
trol, or, conversely, come to accept the delivery of social and economic needs
through a rapidly-growing, complex, and increasingly autonomous sphere.
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